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Procurement is a fairly common seen activity in the economy. This thesis aims to 
learn about whether buyers and sellers trust and reciprocate in procurement using 
buyer-determined auction and incomplete contract, and how’s the effect of revealing 
bids in the same group on sellers’ choice of quality level using experimental way. 
In the experiment, sellers are given the same cost schedule and capable of 
producing goods at different quality levels. At the beginning of the auction, each seller 
offers a price to the buyer in their group. After observing bids in the group, the buyer 
chooses one seller to trade with. Then the chosen seller chooses one of the quality 
levels and provides good to the buyer at this level. The difference between two 
treatments is the information the chosen seller gets when choosing quality. The chosen 
seller knows only his/her own bid when choosing quality in concealed bid treatment 
and in revealed bid treatment he/she will know about both bids in the group. 
The result shows the existence of gift-exchange between buyers and sellers, as 
the quality increases with price and buyers are willing to choose the higher bid in their 
group. Also, the sellers react to the different information given to them. Knowing that 
he/she is chosen with the bid being highest in the group, the seller will offer higher 
quality at the certain price, and the increase in the quality is proportional to the 
difference between bids in the group. While, the seller will not offer lower quality 
than he/she does without getting the information of he/she is chosen with the bid 
being lowest in the group. 
The conclusion reached is in a procurement using buyer-determined auction and 
incomplete contract, the reveal of bids in the group is recommended, considering 
profits for buyers and sellers, and the quality level in the market. 
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1. 绪  论 
 
2002 年，我国颁布了《中华人民共和国政府采购法》（以下简称《政府采购




年，全国政府采购规模为 1009 亿元，到 2011 年，政府采购规模增加到了 11332.5







































1.1   研究思路 
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